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Constitutional Developments in Mechanisms of Oversight over Public Administration in Islamic Arab Countries

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This article examines the constitutional development of mechanisms of oversight over public administration in Islamic Arab countries, with particular attention to the interaction between Islamic normative principles, modern constitutionalism, and contemporary requirements of good governance. The study focuses on the transformation of administrative oversight from predominantly hierarchical and executive-centered control toward more institutionalized, multidimensional, and participatory forms of accountability. It analyzes the constitutional foundations of oversight, including legality, justice, trust, consultation, public responsibility, equality, and protection of the public interest, and explains how these principles have been incorporated into modern mechanisms of administrative control. The article also explores the development of parliamentary oversight, judicial review, constitutional adjudication, financial and integrity supervision, mechanisms governing the appointment and accountability of public officials, and the growing role of civil society and popular participation. Particular emphasis is placed on the constitutional significance of recognizing Islam as the religion of the state or Islamic Sharia as a source of legislation and on the need to translate such provisions into clear and enforceable institutional arrangements. The analysis shows that the principal challenge in Islamic Arab countries does not lie in an inherent contradiction between Islamic reference and modern administrative oversight, but in the gap between constitutional principles and their practical implementation. Effective oversight requires independent institutions, transparent procedures, access to information, judicial protection, merit-based public employment, effective anti-corruption mechanisms, and meaningful public participation. The article concludes that the constitutional evolution of administrative oversight should be understood as a process of institutional integration in which Islamic values, constitutional legality, administrative professionalism, and popular accountability operate within a coherent system of responsible governance.

Keywords: *Public Administration; Constitutional Oversight; Islamic Arab Countries; Administrative Accountability; Islamic Sharia; Transparency; Good Governance; Popular Oversight*

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1. Introduction

Public administration occupies a central position in the constitutional architecture of the modern state because it is the institutional mechanism through which constitutional principles are translated into public policies, services, regulations, and binding administrative decisions. In Islamic Arab countries, however, the constitutional position of public administration is shaped by a particularly complex normative environment in which modern constitutionalism, administrative legality, popular

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sovereignty, religious legitimacy, and Islamic Sharia interact within the same political and legal order. The constitutional recognition of Islam as the religion of the state or of Islamic Sharia as a principal or fundamental source of legislation introduces an additional normative layer into administrative organization and oversight. This religious reference is not necessarily confined to the symbolic definition of state identity; it may influence the understanding of legality, responsibility, public interest, integrity, and the ethical obligations of public authorities. Comparative constitutional experience in Arab states demonstrates that the relationship between religion and state institutions has evolved considerably as constitutional systems have attempted to reconcile inherited Islamic values with contemporary forms of representative government and legal accountability (Al-Nuwaini, 2021). The development of Islamic constitutional thought itself shows that constitutional organization in Muslim societies has long been concerned with defining the sources, limits, and purposes of political authority rather than merely identifying the formal institutions of government (Abdulsalam, 2022). At the same time, the constitutional position of Sharia has generated continuing debate over whether religious norms should function as a binding legal standard, a source of legislative orientation, an ethical framework, or a combination of these roles (Al-Abbar, 2021). These debates become especially significant when attention shifts from legislation in the abstract to the daily exercise of administrative authority, because public administration is the area in which state power most directly encounters individuals, public employees, social organizations, and economic actors.

The contemporary importance of administrative oversight in Islamic Arab countries is inseparable from broader transformations in constitutional government. Historically, public authority in many political systems was closely associated with the personal power of rulers, while administrative responsibility was understood primarily as obedience within a hierarchical chain of command. The emergence of written constitutions and modern administrative institutions gradually transformed this relationship by placing governmental action within a system of legal competences, procedural limitations, and institutional accountability. Constitutional development in the Arab world has therefore involved not merely the adoption of new texts but also an attempt to redefine the relationship between ruler, administration, law, and citizen. Comparative experiences in constitution-making illustrate that constitutional texts acquire real significance only when they establish enforceable mechanisms capable of restraining political and administrative power (Hilal, 2013). Within Islamic constitutional thought, this process has also required reconsideration of the relationship between political power and religious legitimacy. Islamic constitutional projects historically sought to articulate a system in which governmental authority would remain subject to higher normative obligations rather than operate as unrestricted political discretion (Al-Jundi, 1983). Similar concerns appear in later discussions of constitutional government in Islamic countries, particularly regarding the need to harmonize constitutional institutions with the principles of Islamic law without undermining the rule of law or the institutional organization of the state (Al-Sudairi, 1987). The modern problem of oversight therefore emerges from a dual transformation: the shift from personalized to institutional government and the movement from largely moral forms of responsibility toward legally structured mechanisms of control.

The Islamic normative tradition provides concepts that can support rather than obstruct the development of administrative accountability. Justice, trust, consultation, responsibility, and the protection of the public interest are deeply embedded in Islamic legal and ethical thought. The relationship between Sharia and the rule of law has been interpreted as one in which public power is constrained by normative standards that transcend the preferences of individual rulers (Wasfi, 1975). The objectives of Sharia likewise provide a framework in which legal interpretation is linked to the protection of welfare, justice, and the broader interests of society rather than to rigid formalism alone (Al-Misawi, 2007). When these ideas are translated into modern administrative law, they can be understood as supporting requirements of legality, competence, impartiality, transparency, and accountability. Ethical theories of governance within the Islamic and Arab legal tradition have similarly emphasized that the exercise of public power carries duties toward society and cannot be reduced to an unrestricted entitlement of officeholders (Mutawalli, 2014). The constitutional significance of these principles lies in the possibility of integrating them

into institutional arrangements that allow public authorities to be monitored, challenged, corrected, and, where necessary, sanctioned. The development of such mechanisms marks a transition from a predominantly ethical conception of responsibility toward a constitutionalized model of administrative oversight.

This transition is especially important because constitutional provisions concerning religion and public authority can produce different practical outcomes depending on how they are interpreted and institutionalized. The formal declaration that Islam is the state religion may operate mainly as a statement of constitutional identity, while a clause recognizing Sharia as the principal or a fundamental source of legislation may have more direct consequences for legislation and constitutional adjudication. Comparative scholarship on references to Islam and Sharia in constitutional documents demonstrates that the wording and placement of such provisions can significantly affect their legal meaning and their relationship with rights and governmental powers (Bdeir & Khalil, 2019). The interaction between religious reference and civil state institutions has therefore become one of the central issues of contemporary Arab constitutionalism (Al-Shalash, 2018). Rather than assuming an automatic contradiction between the two, constitutional practice increasingly reveals efforts to construct institutional compromises in which religious principles, popular participation, legislative authority, and judicial review coexist within a single legal order. These arrangements are particularly relevant to public administration because administrative bodies must act within the limits of ordinary legislation while also remaining consistent with constitutional principles and the broader value system of the state.

The Arab constitutional experience also reveals a recurring gap between normative constitutional commitments and administrative practice. Constitutions may proclaim justice, equality, integrity, public responsibility, and the supremacy of law, yet administrative systems may remain dominated by centralization, executive discretion, patronage, weak transparency, or limited participation. The problem is therefore not simply whether appropriate principles exist but whether institutional mechanisms are sufficiently independent, accessible, and effective to enforce them. Human rights within constitutional and Islamic frameworks depend upon mechanisms capable of preventing public authorities from transforming formal powers into arbitrary interference with individual rights (Abd Zaid, 2023). In the administrative sphere, this requires oversight that is capable of reviewing appointments, disciplinary procedures, financial management, public expenditure, regulatory decisions, administrative contracts, and the conduct of public officials. The effectiveness of such oversight depends on more than the existence of constitutional language. It requires institutions empowered to investigate, review, correct, and publicize administrative misconduct, together with legal procedures through which citizens can challenge unlawful acts.

Another dimension of the problem concerns the transformation of oversight from vertical state control into a broader system of constitutional accountability. Traditional administrative supervision generally operates through hierarchical authority, whereby superior officials monitor subordinates. Contemporary constitutional governance, by contrast, increasingly incorporates parliamentary scrutiny, judicial review, constitutional adjudication, independent oversight bodies, civil-society participation, public access to information, ethical regulation, and popular monitoring. This expansion reflects a growing recognition that administrative legality cannot be secured by executive self-supervision alone. The constitutional relationship between Sharia and legislation also supports the idea that public power must remain subject to standards external to executive discretion (Al-Othmani, 2021). Similarly, discussions of the implementation of Islamic Sharia emphasize that constitutional reference to religious principles requires institutional translation if it is to have practical significance (Jamal al-Din Atiya, 2012). The modern challenge is therefore to design oversight mechanisms capable of integrating legal, political, ethical, and social forms of accountability without creating institutional conflict or allowing religious language to become a substitute for enforceable controls.

The problem becomes more complex because Islamic Arab countries do not share a single constitutional model. Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Qatar, Palestine, and other Arab jurisdictions differ in their constitutional histories, political systems, degree of institutional pluralism, interpretation of Sharia, and

organization of executive power. Some constitutional systems place greater emphasis on Islamic identity, while others combine religious references with strong commitments to civil institutions, pluralism, or representative government. The legal relationship between religion and the state has therefore evolved differently across national contexts (Al-Nuwaini, 2021). These variations make comparative analysis necessary because constitutional oversight cannot be understood through a single abstract model. The effectiveness of parliamentary control, judicial independence, appointment procedures, integrity institutions, or citizen participation depends on the broader constitutional structure in which those mechanisms operate.

The objective of this article is to analyze the constitutional development of mechanisms of oversight over public administration in selected Islamic Arab countries and to explain how these mechanisms have evolved from ethically grounded and executive-centered forms of control toward more institutionalized, participatory, and legally enforceable systems of accountability. The analysis focuses on the constitutional foundations of administrative oversight, the development of institutional mechanisms of control, and the contemporary movement toward transparency, integrity, popular participation, and the coordination of religious and civil normative frameworks. It adopts a comparative analytical approach that examines common constitutional tendencies while recognizing substantial differences among Arab-Islamic systems. The article does not attempt to provide a comprehensive linguistic history of administrative terminology or a general theory of religious democracy. Instead, it concentrates specifically on the constitutional structures through which administrative power is monitored, constrained, and held responsible.

This focus is particularly necessary because the constitutional future of public administration in Islamic Arab countries depends on whether states can transform broad normative commitments into practical systems of accountability. Islamic constitutional principles may provide a strong ethical foundation for responsible government, but constitutional effectiveness ultimately requires institutional design. Administrative officials must be subject to law, appointments must be based on competence and equality, public resources must be protected through transparent procedures, citizens must have access to mechanisms of complaint and review, and oversight institutions must possess sufficient independence to operate without political interference. The contemporary constitutional challenge is therefore not whether Islamic reference and modern administrative oversight can coexist, but how their relationship should be structured so that religious legitimacy strengthens rather than weakens the rule of law, public accountability, and good governance.

2. Constitutional Foundations of Oversight over Public Administration

The constitutional foundations of oversight over public administration in Islamic Arab countries emerge from the intersection of three principal traditions: the ethical and legal principles of Islamic governance, the institutional logic of modern constitutionalism, and the administrative requirements of the contemporary state. These traditions have not developed in isolation. Rather, the constitutional systems of Arab-Islamic countries reflect continuous interaction between inherited normative concepts and modern governmental structures. The position of Sharia within constitutional texts is particularly important because it influences the normative standards against which public authority is evaluated. Islamic constitutional thought has historically regarded political power as a form of responsibility rather than an unrestricted personal privilege, and the idea that rulers and officials are accountable for the exercise of entrusted authority corresponds closely with contemporary constitutional understandings of public office. The relationship between Islamic law and constitutional order has therefore been framed around questions of legitimacy, responsibility, and limits on authority (Al-Sharif, 2013). The constitutionalization of such principles allows concepts traditionally expressed through religious and ethical discourse to acquire legal and institutional significance.

One of the most important foundations of administrative oversight is the concept of trust. Public office, from an Islamic normative perspective, is not private property and does not confer an unconditional entitlement to authority. It is a responsibility exercised for the benefit of the community. This understanding is consistent with the broader ethical conception of governance in which authority is justified only when exercised according to

justice and public welfare (Mutawalli, 2014). In constitutional terms, the implication is that administrative officials must remain accountable for the legality, fairness, and integrity of their conduct. Trust therefore provides an ethical foundation for institutional controls over appointment, promotion, expenditure, public contracting, and disciplinary authority. It also helps explain why corruption, favoritism, and misuse of office are treated not merely as technical administrative violations but as fundamental breaches of the moral basis of government.

The principle of justice provides a second constitutional foundation. Islamic legal thought treats justice as a central objective of public authority, while modern constitutionalism requires public administration to exercise power according to general rules rather than arbitrary preferences. The connection between these traditions creates a strong normative basis for administrative legality. The realism of Islamic legislation has been understood in part through its capacity to respond to social conditions while preserving fundamental principles of justice and order (Al-Hasan, 2006). This flexibility is significant for public administration because contemporary states confront regulatory problems that were not addressed in classical institutional forms. Oversight mechanisms therefore need not replicate historical arrangements in order to remain consistent with Islamic principles. Instead, modern procedures of judicial review, administrative auditing, parliamentary scrutiny, and institutional accountability can be regarded as contemporary instruments for realizing enduring normative objectives.

Consultation constitutes another important bridge between Islamic governance and modern constitutional oversight. The concept of Shura reflects the expectation that political authority should not be exercised in complete isolation from the community. Although Shura and modern representative democracy are not identical concepts, they share an emphasis on limiting unilateral decision-making and recognizing the relevance of collective participation. The constitutional development of popular oversight can therefore be interpreted as an institutional extension of the broader principle that rulers should remain responsive to those affected by public decisions. The movement from informal consultation toward elected legislatures, public hearings, civil-society involvement, and mechanisms for citizen complaints represents a significant transformation in the institutional expression of accountability. The constitutional importance of this development lies in its capacity to convert participation from a discretionary political practice into a legally recognized dimension of governance.

The place of Islamic Sharia as a constitutional source of legislation further shapes the foundations of oversight. Constitutional references to Sharia differ in wording, scope, and legal effect. Some constitutions identify Islam as the religion of the state, while others expressly recognize the principles of Islamic Sharia as a principal or fundamental source of legislation. The legal consequences of these formulations depend on the broader constitutional system and the institutions responsible for interpreting them. The position of Sharia within constitutional provisions has therefore become a major issue of legal interpretation, particularly where religious norms interact with civil legislation and public institutions (Al-Abbar, 2021). In practical terms, a constitutional commitment to Sharia may influence the standards applied to public administration by emphasizing justice, honesty, protection of public resources, and responsibility toward the community. Yet the effectiveness of these principles depends on whether they are translated into legislation, administrative procedures, and enforceable standards.

This distinction between symbolic reference and institutional implementation is crucial. A constitution may proclaim Islamic identity without establishing any specific administrative consequence, while another constitutional system may incorporate religious principles into legislative review or constitutional adjudication. The broader relationship between religion and legislation has evolved through codification movements that attempted to reconcile traditional jurisprudential sources with the organizational requirements of modern legal systems (Aydin, 2008). These developments demonstrate that the incorporation of religious reference into state law is not a simple act of textual reproduction. It requires interpretation, institutional mediation, and legal adaptation. The same is true for administrative oversight. Religious principles acquire operational meaning only when they are connected to concrete rules governing public institutions.

The principle of legality forms a further constitutional foundation. Modern public administration is distinguished from personal rule by the idea that administrative power must be exercised under law. Administrative bodies may possess discretion, but their powers are constitutionally and legally defined. This principle has particular significance in states where executive institutions historically enjoyed extensive authority. The constitutionalization of administrative legality shifts the source of legitimacy from personal command toward legally organized competence. Islamic legal thought can reinforce this transition because the rule of law within an Islamic framework rejects the idea that governmental authority is entirely self-justifying (Wasfi, 1975). The existence of higher normative standards means that rulers and administrators are themselves subject to limits. In contemporary constitutional systems, those limits are enforced through legislation, courts, parliamentary controls, and other supervisory institutions.

The public interest also plays a central role in connecting Islamic objectives with administrative oversight. Classical and contemporary discussions of the objectives of Sharia emphasize that legal rules should serve the welfare of society and protect essential interests (Al-Misawi, 2007). Public administration similarly derives its legitimacy from service to the public interest. The convergence of these ideas supports the view that administrative decisions must be assessed not only for formal legality but also for their consistency with legitimate public purposes. Oversight institutions therefore play an important role in preventing administrative power from being diverted toward private, partisan, sectarian, or personal objectives.

Constitutional equality constitutes another essential foundation. Public administration exercises authority over citizens and controls access to employment, services, permits, public benefits, and many other aspects of social life. If administrative discretion is exercised according to political loyalty, sectarian affiliation, family connections, or economic influence, constitutional equality becomes largely meaningless. Human rights within an Islamic and constitutional framework require protection against unjustified discrimination and arbitrary state action (Abd Zaid, 2023). In the public-service context, equality requires fair access to employment and promotion, objective standards of competence, and transparent disciplinary procedures. The constitutional recognition of Islamic values should therefore reinforce rather than undermine equal treatment. Justice and trust cannot be reconciled with an administrative system that distributes public offices or benefits through favoritism.

At the same time, the religious dimension of constitutional identity may create tensions if it is used to justify exclusion or politicized administrative practices. The constitutional relationship between religion and the state must therefore be understood in institutional rather than purely ideological terms. Comparative analysis of modern Arab constitutions demonstrates that religious identity and constitutional pluralism may coexist in different configurations (Al-Nuwaini, 2021). The challenge is to prevent religious reference from becoming an instrument of administrative discrimination while preserving its legitimate ethical and constitutional significance. This requires clear legal standards, institutional independence, and interpretive approaches capable of distinguishing between genuine constitutional obligations and partisan uses of religious language.

The foundations of oversight are also connected to the principle of responsibility. Administrative authority must be accompanied by mechanisms through which officials can be required to explain and justify their decisions. In traditional settings, responsibility may have been conceived primarily as moral or religious accountability. Modern constitutionalism adds institutional forms of responsibility, including parliamentary questioning, judicial review, financial auditing, disciplinary liability, and public scrutiny. The evolution from moral responsibility to institutional accountability is one of the most important constitutional developments in the governance of public administration. Religious norms continue to provide ethical motivation, but constitutional government requires procedures through which violations can be identified and corrected.

The distinction between moral obligation and legal enforceability is therefore central to the development of oversight. Islamic ethics may condemn corruption, abuse of power, and betrayal of trust, but an effective administrative system cannot rely solely on personal conscience. Constitutional government requires formal mechanisms capable of investigating misconduct and

imposing consequences. This does not diminish the importance of religious values. Rather, it gives them institutional expression. The implementation of Sharia within contemporary legal systems has similarly been understood as requiring mechanisms that connect general principles with practical legal rules (Jamal al-Din Atiya, 2012). Public administration must therefore be governed by systems in which ethical expectations are reinforced through legal standards.

The interaction between religious and civil legislation is another foundation of modern administrative oversight. Public administration operates primarily through statutes, regulations, decrees, and administrative decisions. If constitutional law recognizes Sharia as a legislative source, these legal instruments must be interpreted within the broader constitutional hierarchy. At the same time, the complexity of modern administration requires highly technical regulations that may have no direct historical equivalent in Islamic jurisprudence. Contemporary constitutional practice therefore depends on a method of integration rather than direct replication. Codification and legal modernization have historically served as mechanisms through which religious legal principles were adapted to modern state institutions (Aydin, 2008). The administrative sphere reflects the same logic: public-sector employment rules, procurement regulations, auditing systems, digital governance, and anti-corruption procedures may all be modern in form while remaining compatible with Islamic constitutional values. The constitutional foundations of oversight thus do not point toward a single institutional model. They establish a normative framework within which different mechanisms can operate. Justice supports judicial review and equal treatment. Trust supports integrity regulation and ethical accountability. Consultation supports parliamentary and popular participation. Public welfare supports performance review and responsible policy implementation. Legality supports judicial and administrative control. Equality supports merit-based public employment. These principles become constitutionally significant when they are connected to institutions capable of enforcement.

The contemporary evolution of Arab-Islamic constitutionalism therefore reflects a movement from general ethical declarations toward increasingly differentiated systems of accountability. The central question is no longer whether public authorities should be responsible, but how responsibility should be structured. Constitutional development has gradually distributed oversight across multiple institutions rather than leaving it solely within the executive hierarchy. This development provides the foundation for modern systems in which legislative bodies, courts, administrative supervisors, independent agencies, civil society, and citizens may all participate in controlling public administration. The next stage of analysis concerns the institutional mechanisms through which this constitutional responsibility is exercised.

3. Development of Institutional Mechanisms of Administrative Oversight

The institutional development of administrative oversight in Islamic Arab countries has involved a gradual transition from concentrated executive supervision toward a more complex network of constitutional controls. Traditional administrative organization often emphasized hierarchical authority, with senior officials responsible for supervising subordinate bodies. Such internal control remains necessary for administrative coordination, but modern constitutional systems increasingly recognize that executive self-supervision is insufficient to guarantee legality, integrity, and accountability. The constitutional development of oversight therefore involves the multiplication of institutions capable of reviewing administrative action from different perspectives. Legislative bodies scrutinize government policy and expenditure, courts review legality, constitutional courts assess conformity with higher norms, audit and integrity institutions monitor public resources, and society increasingly participates through complaints, media exposure, and civic monitoring. This institutional pluralization reflects a deeper transformation in the concept of governmental responsibility.

Executive supervision remains the most immediate form of administrative control. Ministries, departments, and public bodies are generally organized hierarchically, allowing superior authorities to review decisions, issue instructions, correct errors, and discipline officials. In Islamic Arab states, executive institutions may also be constitutionally associated with the responsibility to preserve the religious and legal identity of the state. The relationship between religion and legislation means that

executive action cannot be viewed solely as a technical process detached from constitutional values (Al-Othmani, 2021). Administrative authorities must operate within legislation that itself forms part of a constitutional system shaped by legal and, in many jurisdictions, Islamic normative references. However, executive supervision has clear limitations. The same authority that produces administrative decisions may be reluctant to expose its own failures, particularly where political centralization is strong. For this reason, the development of external oversight is essential.

Parliamentary oversight represents one of the principal constitutional mechanisms for holding the executive and public administration accountable. Legislatures can exercise control through questioning ministers, examining government programs, reviewing public expenditure, investigating administrative failures, and adopting legislation that defines the powers and responsibilities of public bodies. In constitutional systems that recognize representative government, parliamentary scrutiny gives institutional expression to the principle that public administration ultimately serves society rather than the executive alone. Comparative constitutional experiences demonstrate that the effectiveness of such mechanisms depends heavily on the distribution of power between legislative and executive authorities (Hilal, 2013). Where executive institutions dominate parliament, legislative oversight may become largely formal. Where parliament possesses genuine investigative and financial powers, it can operate as an important restraint on administrative authority.

The constitutional significance of parliamentary oversight is particularly strong in relation to public finance. Administrative institutions manage substantial public resources, and the allocation of these resources directly affects social welfare, economic development, and citizen trust. Islamic ethical principles reinforce the importance of protecting public wealth because misuse of collective resources can be understood as a breach of trust. The ethical framework of governance therefore complements parliamentary and financial supervision by emphasizing that public money is not available for private or partisan exploitation (Mutawalli, 2014). Effective oversight requires transparent budgeting, accurate reporting, independent auditing, and the possibility of questioning officials responsible for financial misconduct.

Judicial review constitutes another essential mechanism. Administrative courts or ordinary courts, depending on the national system, provide citizens with a legal avenue for challenging unlawful administrative decisions. Judicial control transforms constitutional legality from a general principle into an enforceable right. Without access to independent courts, citizens remain dependent on the goodwill of administrative authorities to correct their own errors. The rule of law within an Islamic constitutional framework similarly requires that governmental power remain subject to legal standards (Wasfi, 1975). Judicial review therefore fits naturally within both modern constitutionalism and the broader Islamic principle that authority must not operate arbitrarily.

The role of constitutional adjudication is also significant, particularly in systems where Sharia possesses constitutional status. Constitutional courts may review legislation affecting public administration and determine whether statutes comply with constitutional principles. In jurisdictions where the constitution recognizes the principles of Islamic Sharia as a principal source of legislation, constitutional adjudication may also involve interpreting the relationship between religious principles and modern legislation. The position of Sharia within constitutional provisions has generated considerable discussion concerning the proper boundaries of judicial interpretation (Al-Abbar, 2021). The development of constitutional review has therefore created an institutional mechanism through which tensions between modern administrative legislation and religious constitutional references can be resolved within a legal framework rather than through purely political dispute.

The Egyptian experience is particularly important in this regard because it illustrates how modern administrative legislation may coexist with constitutional recognition of Islamic Sharia. The relevant constitutional approach does not necessarily require literal reproduction of historical jurisprudential rules in every area of public administration. Rather, the legal system can distinguish between definitive principles and matters open to legislative choice. This interpretive flexibility corresponds with broader efforts to reconcile Islamic law with modern codification (Aydin, 2008). The

significance for administrative oversight is substantial. It allows the development of contemporary civil-service rules, financial controls, organizational regulations, and disciplinary systems while maintaining a constitutional commitment to religious legal principles.

The appointment and accountability of public officials constitute another major area of institutional development. Public employment is not merely an internal organizational matter because administrative officials exercise public power and control access to state services. The constitutional principles of equality, competence, and integrity therefore require appointment procedures that minimize favoritism and political patronage. Human rights and constitutional equality support the view that access to public office should not depend on arbitrary distinctions (Abd Zaid, 2023). Within an Islamic normative framework, the requirements of trustworthiness and competence further reinforce merit-based appointment. The combination of these principles creates a dual standard: officials should possess the professional capacity to perform their duties and the ethical integrity necessary to exercise public authority responsibly.

The tension between centralized appointment and broader institutional participation remains a recurring constitutional problem. In highly centralized systems, senior executive authorities may control a large proportion of appointments, creating risks of politicization. Decentralized or pluralistic systems may distribute appointment authority among different institutions, require parliamentary approval, establish independent civil-service commissions, or subject appointments to judicial review. The constitutional development of oversight in this area therefore concerns not only who is selected but also who controls the selection process. A system that formally requires competence but allows unrestricted discretionary appointment may not effectively protect administrative neutrality.

Disciplinary accountability complements appointment control. Officials who violate legal or ethical duties must be subject to procedures capable of investigating misconduct and imposing proportionate sanctions. Administrative discipline must itself respect legality and fairness, because disciplinary power can be misused for political retaliation. The constitutional challenge is therefore to design systems that are strong enough to address corruption and negligence but sufficiently regulated to prevent arbitrary punishment. Islamic legal thought concerning responsibility and justice supports this balance. The aim is not merely to punish wrongdoing but to preserve trust in public institutions.

Independent oversight bodies have become increasingly important within modern constitutional governance. Audit institutions, anti-corruption agencies, integrity commissions, ombudsman-type bodies, and specialized supervisory authorities can provide forms of review that are institutionally distinct from the executive departments they monitor. Their effectiveness depends heavily on independence, investigative authority, access to information, and protection from political interference. The expansion of such bodies reflects dissatisfaction with traditional mechanisms that were often too closely connected to the institutions under review. The constitutional logic is clear: oversight is more credible when the supervising institution is not subordinate to the authority whose conduct it examines.

Religious institutions may also possess an indirect or direct supervisory role in some Islamic Arab systems. Where constitutions assign significance to Sharia, official religious institutions may advise on the compatibility of legislation or public policy with Islamic principles. However, the legitimacy of such participation depends on institutional clarity. Religious oversight should not become an undefined parallel authority capable of interfering arbitrarily in administrative affairs. The relationship between religious and state institutions must be legally structured, particularly because the politicization of religious authority can undermine both administrative neutrality and religious credibility. The broader debate on Islamic legislation and the civil state demonstrates the importance of defining institutional competences rather than relying on vague assertions of religious authority (Al-Shalash, 2018).

The Iraqi constitutional setting illustrates the complexity of this issue. Constitutional recognition of Islam as a fundamental source of legislation raises questions regarding the institutional mechanisms through which this principle should influence public policy and administrative regulation. A purely symbolic approach may render the constitutional provision ineffective, while an undefined religious supervisory power may create institutional conflict. The constitutional solution requires clear jurisdiction, professional expertise, and

legal procedures. Religious institutions can contribute to oversight by providing principled interpretation, but their role must remain compatible with the constitutional hierarchy and with the independence of other public institutions.

Civil-society participation represents another important development in oversight. Constitutional accountability is no longer understood solely as a relationship among state institutions. Associations, professional organizations, media, academic institutions, and civic groups can contribute to monitoring administrative performance. This development can be interpreted within an Islamic framework as an extension of consultation, social responsibility, and collective concern for public welfare. The constitutional significance of such participation lies in its capacity to reveal information that may not emerge through formal bureaucratic channels. Civil society can identify corruption, expose administrative injustice, advocate for reform, and provide expertise in policy evaluation.

Whistleblower protection further strengthens institutional oversight by allowing insiders to reveal misconduct without fear of retaliation. Although such mechanisms are modern in legal form, their normative foundation is consistent with the broader obligation to prevent abuse of public trust. An administrative system that punishes individuals for exposing corruption undermines both transparency and responsibility. Effective constitutional oversight therefore requires legal protections for those who disclose wrongdoing in good faith.

Access to information is equally important. Oversight cannot function effectively if administrative decisions, financial records, appointment procedures, and regulatory criteria remain hidden from public scrutiny. Transparency converts administrative action from an internal bureaucratic process into a form of public responsibility. The ethical dimension of governance supports openness because officials exercise authority on behalf of the community rather than for private purposes. The implementation of religious principles within modern legal systems requires practical institutional mechanisms rather than abstract moral declarations (Jamal al-Din Atiya, 2012). Transparency legislation, publication requirements, and access-to-information procedures can therefore be understood as modern instruments for realizing older principles of accountable government.

The development of institutional oversight also depends on coordination among different bodies. Parliamentary, judicial, executive, financial, religious, and civic mechanisms should not operate as isolated systems. Fragmentation can produce duplication, conflicting decisions, or gaps in responsibility. The constitutional challenge is to establish a coherent framework in which each institution has a defined role while remaining capable of cooperation. Effective oversight requires both separation and interaction: institutions must be independent enough to review one another but coordinated enough to prevent administrative misconduct from falling between jurisdictional boundaries.

The institutional evolution of administrative oversight in Islamic Arab countries therefore reflects a broader constitutional transformation. Control has moved beyond hierarchical supervision toward a plural system involving multiple actors and standards. This transition remains incomplete in many jurisdictions, but its direction is clear. Public administration is increasingly treated as a constitutionally accountable institution rather than merely an executive instrument. The continuing challenge is to strengthen the independence, transparency, and practical effectiveness of oversight mechanisms while ensuring that religious constitutional principles contribute to, rather than substitute for, enforceable institutional responsibility.

4. Contemporary Transformation toward Popular, Transparent, and Integrated Oversight

The contemporary transformation of administrative oversight in Islamic Arab countries is characterized by a movement from predominantly hierarchical and state-centered control toward a broader model combining legality, transparency, integrity, citizen participation, ethical responsibility, and institutional pluralism. This transformation reflects changing expectations about the relationship between the state and society. Citizens increasingly demand not only that government act lawfully but also that it explain its decisions, disclose relevant information, prevent corruption, and provide accessible mechanisms for complaint and review. These developments do not necessarily conflict with Islamic constitutional identity. On the contrary, principles of

justice, trust, consultation, and public welfare can provide a normative foundation for more open and accountable administration. The challenge is to transform these values into institutional practices rather than leaving them at the level of constitutional rhetoric.

Transparency is one of the most important elements of this transformation. Traditional administrative systems often operated through bureaucratic secrecy, with limited disclosure of decision-making procedures or public expenditure. Contemporary governance increasingly treats transparency as a constitutional and administrative necessity. The Islamic ethical conception of public office reinforces this shift because officials are understood as trustees rather than private owners of administrative authority. Ethical theories of governance emphasize that public power must be exercised in a manner consistent with responsibility and honesty (Mutawalli, 2014). Transparency therefore becomes more than a procedural requirement. It is a mechanism through which the public can evaluate whether officials are fulfilling the trust placed in them.

The constitutional recognition of Sharia can further strengthen the normative basis of integrity. Islamic legal and ethical principles strongly condemn bribery, abuse of authority, and exploitation of public resources. The objectives of Sharia emphasize the protection of public welfare and the prevention of harm (Al-Misawi, 2007). These principles can be translated into contemporary anti-corruption frameworks through financial disclosure requirements, conflict-of-interest rules, procurement controls, audit mechanisms, and independent investigations. The constitutional significance of this translation lies in its ability to connect religious values with concrete administrative standards. Integrity becomes enforceable when ethical expectations are incorporated into legal rules and institutional procedures.

The distinction between symbolic and operational religious reference remains especially important. A constitution may invoke Islam as a source of identity while administrative institutions continue to function according to practices inconsistent with transparency or justice. The position of Sharia in constitutional systems must therefore be assessed not simply by textual formulation but by its effect on institutional behavior (Al-Abbar, 2021). A genuine constitutional commitment to Islamic principles should be reflected in measures that reduce corruption, protect public resources, promote equality, and strengthen responsibility. Religious language loses credibility when it coexists with unchecked administrative abuse.

Popular oversight represents another major dimension of contemporary transformation. Modern constitutional systems increasingly recognize that citizens should participate not only in periodic elections but also in the continuous monitoring of public institutions. This idea has strong affinities with the concept of consultation. Although Shura historically developed in a different political context, its underlying emphasis on collective involvement can support modern mechanisms of participation. Civil-society organizations, professional associations, academic institutions, media, and community groups can contribute to administrative accountability by monitoring performance, disseminating information, and presenting policy alternatives.

The constitutional role of civil society is especially important in settings where formal institutions may be vulnerable to executive dominance. Parliamentary oversight may be weakened by political majorities, judicial review may be slow or inaccessible, and internal administrative controls may lack independence. Civic monitoring provides an additional channel through which administrative conduct can be exposed to scrutiny. This does not mean that civil society should replace constitutional institutions. Rather, it should complement them. The broader relationship between religion and state institutions in modern Arab constitutions shows that constitutional legitimacy increasingly depends on balancing identity, authority, and participation (Al-Nuwaini, 2021). Popular oversight is part of this balance because it allows society to participate in the protection of public interests.

The development of whistleblower protection illustrates the same movement. Administrative corruption is often difficult to detect from outside institutions because relevant information is held by officials themselves. Employees who observe misconduct may be reluctant to report it if they fear dismissal, prosecution, or social retaliation. Effective oversight therefore requires legal mechanisms that protect good-faith disclosures. From an ethical perspective, exposing misuse of public authority can be understood as a defense of trust and public welfare. From a constitutional perspective,

whistleblower protection strengthens accountability by reducing the informational monopoly of administrative authorities.

Access to information also transforms the relationship between administration and society. Public access to government records enables citizens, journalists, researchers, and oversight institutions to examine administrative performance. This mechanism is particularly important in financial management, procurement, public employment, and regulatory decision-making. Transparency prevents administrative authority from becoming insulated from scrutiny and creates conditions for informed participation. It also allows constitutional rights to be exercised more effectively because individuals cannot challenge decisions whose reasons or legal bases remain hidden.

The contemporary transformation of oversight also involves a stronger emphasis on equality and equal opportunity in public service. Public administration cannot claim legitimacy if access to employment and promotion is determined by political loyalty, sectarian affiliation, or personal connections. Constitutional human-rights principles require public institutions to respect equality and dignity (Abd Zaid, 2023). Islamic principles of justice and trust similarly support the selection of officials according to competence and integrity. The convergence of these traditions creates a strong normative basis for merit-based recruitment and transparent promotion.

Morocco provides an important illustration of how Islamic identity can coexist with constitutional recognition of social and cultural plurality. The constitutional model emphasizes the Islamic character of the state while also recognizing diverse components of national identity. Comparative analysis of religion-state relations in Morocco and Tunisia demonstrates that Islamic constitutional references can be integrated into broader frameworks of citizenship and public institutions (Al-Nuwaini, 2021). The relevance for administrative oversight lies in the need to ensure that religious identity does not become a justification for unequal access to public services or public employment. A modern Islamic constitutional state must reconcile its religious reference with the requirements of inclusive administration.

Lebanon, although institutionally distinctive because of its confessional structure, illustrates another challenge: the risk that religious or sectarian organization may affect administrative neutrality. Where public institutions are strongly influenced by communal power-sharing arrangements, oversight mechanisms must prevent constitutional pluralism from turning into administrative patronage. The broader principle remains the same. Religious diversity can be constitutionally protected, but public administration must remain capable of serving the entire population according to general standards of legality and equality.

Sudan provides a further example of the complexity of integrating religious reference and popular accountability. Constitutional approaches that recognize different religious or cultural circumstances within the state demonstrate that oversight may need to be sensitive to social diversity. However, such differentiation cannot eliminate the fundamental requirement that public authorities remain accountable. The constitutional purpose of oversight is to ensure that diversity does not become a basis for arbitrary government. Institutional mechanisms must therefore combine respect for social context with uniform commitments to legality, transparency, and responsibility.

Iraq illustrates the challenge of translating constitutional Islamic reference into institutional practice. A constitutional declaration that Islam is the state religion and a fundamental source of legislation does not by itself establish how religious principles should influence administrative oversight. The relationship between religion, legislation, and public institutions requires defined legal mechanisms rather than informal political interpretation. The debate over Islamic legislation and the civil state highlights the importance of preventing religious reference from becoming a tool of partisan domination (Al-Shalash, 2018). Institutional clarity is therefore essential. Religious institutions may contribute expertise, but administrative oversight must remain governed by constitutional procedures, professional standards, and legal competence.

Egypt offers a comparatively developed example of how constitutional interpretation can mediate between Sharia and modern administrative legislation. The constitutional status of the principles of Islamic Sharia has required legal institutions to distinguish between fundamental norms and areas in which lawmakers retain discretion. The relationship between religion and

codification has historically depended on such interpretive processes (Aydin, 2008). This approach allows contemporary administrative laws to operate within an Islamic constitutional framework without requiring every modern institution to have a direct historical equivalent. It also provides space for institutional innovation in areas such as civil service regulation, financial oversight, and administrative justice.

Qatar and Palestine similarly illustrate the importance of translating constitutional religious references into coherent administrative policies. General recognition of Sharia as a legislative source may influence regulatory systems, public employment, accountability, and state-citizen relations. However, effective implementation requires professional legal interpretation. The implementation of Sharia cannot be reduced to the mechanical application of isolated rules (Jamal al-Din Atiya, 2012). The objectives and principles of Islamic law must be interpreted in relation to contemporary institutional realities.

The modernization of administrative oversight also requires renewed religious and legal expertise. Public administration increasingly deals with digital governance, complex procurement systems, international financial standards, data protection, environmental regulation, and sophisticated public-private arrangements. Religious institutions that participate in public-policy evaluation must therefore possess sufficient understanding of contemporary administration. Traditional jurisprudential knowledge remains important, but it must be combined with legal and institutional expertise. Otherwise, religious oversight may become either excessively formalistic or dependent on political authorities for technical interpretation.

At the same time, civil administrators and lawmakers require a working understanding of the constitutional role of Sharia. The divide between religious and civil institutions can produce inconsistent policy if each operates without knowledge of the other. The contemporary model should therefore be based on institutional integration rather than competition. The relationship between religion and legislation has historically evolved through processes of codification and adaptation (Aydin, 2008). Administrative oversight should follow the same logic by creating channels through which legal, administrative, and religious expertise can interact without undermining institutional independence.

Digital administration introduces another significant dimension. Electronic government can improve transparency by reducing discretionary face-to-face interactions, recording administrative procedures, publishing information, and facilitating citizen complaints. It can also strengthen financial control through automated auditing and traceable transactions. These mechanisms are modern technological instruments, but they are fully compatible with constitutional principles of integrity and accountability. Islamic legal thought does not require administrative techniques to remain historically static. The realism and adaptability of Islamic legislation support the use of contemporary means where they serve legitimate public objectives (Al-Hasan, 2006).

International governance experience can likewise contribute to administrative reform. The existence of Islamic constitutional reference does not require isolation from global administrative standards. The relationship between Islam and international legal norms has long generated debate over values, sovereignty, and adaptation (Halliday, 2002). Yet there is no inherent contradiction between benefiting from successful international models and preserving national constitutional identity. Mechanisms such as independent audit institutions, anti-corruption agencies, open-government systems, performance indicators, and judicial review can be adapted to local legal and cultural conditions.

The key issue is selective institutional borrowing rather than uncritical transplantation. Administrative reforms are most sustainable when they correspond to the constitutional structure and political culture of the society in which they operate. Islamic constitutional principles can function as a framework for evaluating imported mechanisms rather than as a reason to reject them. The objectives of Sharia provide sufficient flexibility to assess whether a particular administrative practice promotes justice, public welfare, accountability, and protection of rights (Al-Misawi, 2007). This approach allows Arab-Islamic states to modernize without framing institutional reform as a choice between religious authenticity and contemporary governance.

The future of administrative oversight therefore lies in integration. Effective systems require constitutional rules, independent institutions, ethical standards, transparent procedures, popular participation, and professional expertise. No single mechanism is sufficient. Parliamentary scrutiny cannot replace judicial review, religious ethics cannot substitute for legal enforcement, civil-society monitoring cannot replace institutional auditing, and executive supervision cannot guarantee independent accountability. The contemporary transformation is therefore toward a multi-layered model in which different mechanisms reinforce one another.

This integrated model also requires political commitment. Constitutional texts can create structures, but they cannot guarantee that institutions will act independently. Administrative oversight becomes meaningful only when public authorities accept that accountability is a condition of legitimacy rather than a threat to governmental authority. The constitutional development of Islamic Arab states will therefore depend not only on the design of oversight mechanisms but also on the willingness of political institutions to allow those mechanisms to operate. The central challenge is to convert constitutional values into institutional habits and to ensure that justice, trust, consultation, transparency, and responsibility become operational principles of public administration rather than symbolic declarations.

5. Conclusion

The constitutional development of mechanisms of oversight over public administration in Islamic Arab countries reveals a significant transformation in the understanding of governmental authority. Public administration has gradually moved away from a conception in which it functions primarily as an instrument subordinate to centralized political power toward a constitutional model in which administrative action is increasingly expected to satisfy requirements of legality, transparency, equality, integrity, and public responsibility. This transformation is neither complete nor uniform across the Arab-Islamic world, but the overall direction is visible in the growing constitutional importance of institutional accountability and the increasing recognition that administrative legitimacy depends on more than formal obedience to executive authority.

The development of oversight has been shaped by the interaction between Islamic normative principles and modern constitutional institutions. Concepts such as justice, trust, consultation, responsibility, and protection of the public interest provide a strong ethical foundation for accountable administration. These principles demonstrate that modern mechanisms of oversight do not necessarily represent an external or incompatible model imposed upon Islamic political systems. Rather, many contemporary institutions can be understood as practical instruments for realizing principles already embedded in the broader Islamic conception of responsible government. Judicial review, parliamentary scrutiny, financial auditing, anti-corruption controls, transparency requirements, and citizen participation can all serve purposes that are consistent with the constitutional commitment to justice and public welfare.

At the same time, the analysis demonstrates that ethical foundations are not sufficient by themselves. One of the most important developments in contemporary constitutionalism is the movement from moral responsibility toward institutional accountability. The legitimacy of public administration cannot depend solely on the personal integrity of officials or on general constitutional declarations. Effective oversight requires institutions with clearly defined competences, adequate independence, access to information, and the authority to investigate and correct unlawful conduct. Where such mechanisms remain weak, broad commitments to justice or Sharia may have little practical effect on administrative behavior.

The distinction between symbolic and operational constitutional provisions is therefore crucial. The recognition of Islam as the religion of the state or of Islamic Sharia as a source of legislation may carry substantial normative importance, but its administrative consequences depend on the legal institutions through which it is interpreted. Religious constitutional provisions are most effective when they reinforce general standards of justice, integrity, responsibility, and protection of the public interest. They become problematic when they are used selectively for political purposes or as a justification for administrative discrimination, partisan patronage, or undefined intervention by religious authorities.

The constitutional future of administrative oversight therefore requires a careful balance between religious reference and institutional clarity. Religious institutions may contribute to the ethical and legal evaluation of public policy, particularly in systems that constitutionally recognize Sharia, but their role should be defined through clear legal procedures. Administrative decisions must remain subject to the constitutional hierarchy, judicial review, and the requirements of professional competence. The objective should not be to create parallel and competing sources of authority, but to establish a coordinated system in which religious principles inform public ethics while constitutional institutions provide enforceable mechanisms of accountability.

The evolution of appointment and accountability mechanisms further illustrates the importance of this balance. Public employment should be based on competence, integrity, equality, and objective standards rather than political or sectarian loyalty. The concentration of appointment authority in executive institutions creates risks of politicization and weakens administrative neutrality. Constitutional systems should therefore develop procedures that distribute oversight over appointments, provide transparent criteria, and allow decisions to be reviewed. The same applies to disciplinary accountability, which must be sufficiently effective to address misconduct while protecting officials from arbitrary or politically motivated punishment.

Judicial oversight remains one of the most important guarantees of administrative legality. Citizens require access to independent institutions capable of reviewing administrative decisions and providing remedies where public authorities exceed their lawful powers. Courts also play a central role in maintaining the balance between constitutional principles and ordinary administrative legislation. Where Sharia has constitutional status, judicial interpretation can help prevent both the marginalization of religious reference and its arbitrary political use. A strong judicial system therefore contributes simultaneously to legality, constitutional identity, and protection of individual rights.

Parliamentary oversight is equally important but depends on the broader distribution of political power. Legislatures must possess meaningful authority to question ministers, investigate administrative failures, review public expenditure, and supervise governmental policies. Formal oversight mechanisms have little value if political structures prevent parliament from exercising them independently. Strengthening legislative scrutiny therefore requires not only constitutional provisions but also institutional practices that respect the separation and balance of powers.

Independent integrity and audit institutions represent another essential component of modern oversight. Their value lies in their ability to review administrative conduct without being fully subordinate to the bodies they monitor. Their independence must be protected through appointment procedures, secure tenure, financial autonomy, and access to relevant records. Anti-corruption institutions in particular require sufficient authority to investigate misconduct at all levels of government. Without such guarantees, oversight agencies may exist formally while remaining ineffective in practice.

Transparency is the condition that connects many of these mechanisms. Administrative accountability cannot function when information is withheld from legislatures, courts, supervisory bodies, or citizens. Public access to information, publication of administrative procedures, disclosure of financial records, transparent procurement, and clear appointment criteria reduce the space for arbitrary discretion. Transparency also improves public confidence by allowing citizens to understand how decisions are made and how public resources are used.

Popular oversight should therefore be regarded as a permanent dimension of constitutional government rather than as an occasional political intervention. Civil society, media, professional associations, researchers, and citizens can provide information and scrutiny that formal institutions may not generate on their own. Their participation is particularly important in detecting corruption, identifying administrative inequality, and evaluating the practical effects of public policies. Such participation should be protected through legal guarantees rather than left dependent on the tolerance of administrative authorities.

Whistleblower protection is an especially important aspect of this participatory model. Officials who disclose misconduct in good faith should not be exposed to retaliation. Internal access to information makes public employees uniquely capable of identifying corruption

and abuse, and legal systems should encourage responsible disclosure. Effective protection strengthens both institutional integrity and citizen confidence.

The development of digital administration offers additional opportunities for oversight. Electronic procedures can increase traceability, reduce discretionary interaction, improve access to information, and create permanent records of administrative decisions. Digital platforms can also simplify complaints, publish performance data, and strengthen financial control. However, digitalization should not be treated as a substitute for legal reform. Technology can increase transparency only when institutions are already subject to clear rules and independent supervision.

The comparative experience of Islamic Arab countries also demonstrates that no single constitutional model can be applied uniformly. Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Qatar, Palestine, and other jurisdictions differ in their historical experience, political organization, constitutional treatment of Islam, and administrative traditions. Reform must therefore remain sensitive to national constitutional structures. The objective should not be institutional uniformity but functional effectiveness. Different countries may use different mechanisms, provided those mechanisms genuinely protect legality, accountability, and the public interest.

The central constitutional challenge is thus to close the gap between principle and practice. Many Arab-Islamic constitutions contain values capable of supporting responsible public administration, yet administrative reality may continue to be affected by centralization, political influence, weak institutional independence, and limited public participation. Constitutional reform must therefore move beyond declaratory language. Oversight bodies require real powers, courts require independence, legislatures require access to information, civil society requires legal protection, and administrative procedures require transparency.

A sustainable model of oversight should also avoid presenting Islamic identity and modern governance as competing alternatives. The more productive approach is to interpret Islamic constitutional principles through institutional mechanisms capable of serving contemporary administrative needs. Justice can be expressed through judicial review and equal treatment. Trust can be protected through anti-corruption rules and financial accountability. Consultation can be institutionalized through parliamentary and civic participation. Public welfare can guide performance evaluation and regulatory policy. Responsibility can be enforced through disciplinary, judicial, and political mechanisms.

The constitutional evolution of oversight over public administration in Islamic Arab countries should therefore be understood as a process of institutional integration. Religious principles, constitutional legality, administrative professionalism, and popular participation must operate within a coherent system rather than as separate or competing spheres. The effectiveness of this model depends on the willingness of political institutions to accept scrutiny, on the professionalism of administrative bodies, and on the independence of those responsible for oversight.

Ultimately, the legitimacy of public administration in Islamic Arab countries will depend on its ability to combine constitutional identity with practical accountability. A state may describe itself as Islamic, democratic, constitutional, or civil, but these descriptions acquire meaning only when citizens can see that public power is exercised lawfully, resources are protected, officials are accountable, rights are respected, and institutions are open to scrutiny. The constitutional development of oversight is therefore not a secondary administrative issue. It lies at the center of the relationship between state and society and determines whether constitutional principles remain symbolic declarations or become effective guarantees of responsible government.

Authors' Contributions

Authors contributed equally to this article.

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In order to correct and improve the academic writing of our paper, we have used the language model ChatGPT.

Transparency Statement

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